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This paper analyzes the role of political variables in the implementation of structural tax reforms 
in 45 emerging market and low-income economies during 2000-2015. The existing literature 
identifies several hypotheses that drive reforms, but empirical studies that support these hypotheses 
are lacking. Relying on a new database of structural tax reforms and on binary-type models, our 
results suggest that a left-wing government is less inclined to implement tax reforms while both 
proximity to elections and political strength or cohesion are positively associated with tax reforms. 
The influence of the left government is stronger in low-income than in emerging market economies 
and revenue administration reforms are resisted the most by such governments. Proximity to 
elections seems to trigger reforms of personal income tax (PIT) but opposite holds for trade tax 
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There is potential to raise more revenues from domestic sources in many low-income and 
emerging market economies, but resistance from vested interests has impaired the implementation 
of measures with revenue potential (Mullins et al., 2020). For example, favorable tax treatment 
accorded to certain consumers and producers has eroded the tax base in these countries. The 
bulk of tax concessions can be found in two areas: corporate income tax and value added tax.  
The average value of concessions is estimated at about 4 percent of GDP in Latin America and 
2.9 percent in Africa and can be as high 40 percent of tax revenues (Gupta and Redonda, 2020). 
Because large and powerful players are able to opt out of the tax system, it affects the overall 
tax compliance as the general population becomes unclear about the benefits of paying taxes. 
The need for more revenues to support these countries´ developmental needs has led 
policymakers and international organizations to call for efforts to undertake fiscal reforms, 
notably in the tax area. At the same time, such reforms are notoriously difficult to design and 
implement and little consensus exists over what factors can help break the deadlock, as theory 
is unsettled and empirical evidence is limited and often inconsistent (see e.g. Drazen, 2000; 
Acemoglu et al., 2006). Furthermore, political fragmentation has led to frequent changes to tax 
policies, creating uncertainty for the private sector and undermining efforts to mobilize 
domestic resources (Gupta and Liu, 2020). As an example, Zambia changed its mining tax 
regime seven times during the 2000-2019 period, mainly because different governments in 
power felt that the mining sector was not contributing enough to the country’s development, 
turning it into a key election issue. A similar unpredictability has existed in other countries with 
tax policy changes in every budget, reflecting political divisions (e.g., Bangladesh and Kenya). 
In Bangladesh, the implementation of tax laws already approved by Parliament was repeatedly 
postponed because of political and electoral considerations. 
 
The purpose of this study is to analyze political considerations that influence the 
implementation of structural tax reforms in a panel of emerging market and low-income 
economies. We use a new “narrative” database of major tax reforms implemented in 45 developing 
economies (23 emerging and 22 low-income) during the 2000-2015 period (Akitoby et al., 2020). 
An important novelty and strength of this database is the precise timing and nature of key 
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legislative tax actions that took place over the 15-year period under scrutiny. We study the extent 
to which ideology, electoral proximity and political strength of different groups has influenced the 
implementation of a series of tax reforms. 
 
By means of binary type model estimations, we find that left-wing governments are less 
inclined to implement structural tax reforms while both proximity to elections and political 
strength or cohesion are positively associated with tax reforms. The influence of the left 
government is particularly strong in low-income than in emerging market economies and revenue 
administration reforms are resisted the most by such governments. Proximity to elections seems 
to trigger reforms of personal income tax (PIT) but opposite holds for trade tax reforms. The 
conclusions of this study should be of interest to those involved in tax reforms in emerging and 
low-income economies.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of related 
literature on the political economy drivers of (tax) reforms. Section 3 presents the empirical 
strategy. Section 4 discusses the data and key stylized facts. Section 5 presents the baseline 
empirical results as well as sensitivity and robustness checks. The last section concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Several political factors can affect the implementation of structural tax reforms. Three political 
considerations have attracted most attention from scholars in relation to fiscal policy decision-
making, namely the role of ideology (Potrafke, 2017; Hallerberg and von Hagen, 2017)1, the 
influence of elections (Klomp and de Haan, 2013; Hubscher and Sattler, 2017) and the impact of 
political fragmentation (Alesina and Perotti, 1995; Crivelli et al., 2015). Empirical evidence 
suggests that these factors have a varying degree of explanatory power (Gaspar et al., 2017). 
Moreover, the bulk of empirical analyses is done for advanced and emerging market economies.  
 
                                                 
1 Relatedly, a recent paper by Duval et al. (2020) finds, by means of a Bayesian averaging maximum likelihood 
estimates (BAMLE) approach, that certain structural reforms (in the area of labor market, for instance) tend to occur 
in right-leaning governments, which is consistent with theories that highlight the ability of entrenched interests to 
block reforms (e.g. Tommasi and Velasco, 1996). 
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Ideology of decision-makers is reflected in tax-and-spending policies adopted by a government. 
Left-wing governments tend to be associated with higher public expenditures on welfare policies 
and a sizable public administration. To finance these expenditures, these governments would be 
expected to tax more and to tax more progressively (Angelopoulos et al.2012). There is some 
evidence that after banking crises and during fiscal adjustment episodes, left-wing governments 
are associated with different revenue-raising measures as compared with right-leaning 
governments (Hallerberg and von Hagen, 2017). In contrast, right-wing governments tend to opt 
for lower levels of public revenue, meaning less taxes. That said, the resistance of left-wing parties 
alongside those of their electorate to carry out reforms has been documented (see e.g. Bortolotti et 
al., 2003 for privatizations). 
 
The literature also identifies the political cycle as an important driver of reforms by emphasizing 
political capital requirements to break reform deadlock as well as re-election pressures and rarely 
these objectives conflict with one another. In fact, national elections can be a source of policy 
volatility when the incumbents seek to use tax and spending policies for re-election purposes. The 
underlying objective of incumbents is to influence the median voter during the elections. This is 
because reforms may entail short-term costs while gains can take time to materialize. 
Consequently, some have found that reforms are less likely before elections and more likely in the 
beginning of a term (see e.g. Alesina et al., 2006; Bonfiglioli and Gancia, 2013 that looked at 
structural reforms more generally in labor and product markets in advanced economies). In 
countries where fiscal institutions are weak and budget transparency lacking, there is risk that 
election-induced tax and spending policies may not be appropriate from a macroeconomic 
perspective.   
 
In a government with a large number of veto players and fragmented decision making, there is 
a tendency to preserve the status quo on fiscal matters (Tsebelis, 1995, 2000, 2002).  Changes in 
tax and spending policies occur only when a certain number of institutional or partisan actors 
agree. As the number of veto players increases, fiscal policy changes become slower, leading to 
suboptimal fiscal policy outcomes (Spolaore, 2004). This problem is compounded when there are 
major ideological differences among veto players, making likelihood of a policy change from the 
status quo even more difficult (Franzese, 2007; Tsebelis and Chang, 2004). While in theory 
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fractionalization in the government coalition should increase the ability of small parties to block 
reforms (Alesina and Drazen, 1991), its empirical impact has ranged from entirely insignificant 
(Wiese, 2014) to highly significant (Alesina et al., 2006). 
Note that reform strategies such as packaging or sequencing of reforms have been found to 
overcome some of the political conundrums discussed earlier (see e.g. Cacciatore et al. (2016) for 
a theoretical model-based result). Furthermore, while some studies have documented a positive 
effect of democracy on reforms (Giuliano et al., 2013), we do not test for it here because the time 
span covered ranges from 2000 to 2015 and the majority of countries under scrutiny has score high 
on this dimension in the often used Polity IV index (in addition to the fact that these slow-moving 
indicators are captured by fixed effects). 
 
3. Econometric Methodology 
 
A structural tax reform (STR) for country i at time t takes the value one as identified in the 
narrative database—the next section provides details on data. All other non-reform years take the 
value zero.2 Based on this binary characterization, our baseline exercise consists in estimating 
logistic regressions to assess the likelihood of a tax reform by testing specifically the political 
economy channel, while controlling for other variables identified in the literature affecting the 
implementation of reforms.3 In particular, we estimate the following reduced-form model:4 
 
 Prob(STR = 1|𝑋) = 𝛷(𝜆𝑖 + 𝑃𝑜𝑙′𝜶 + 𝑋′𝜷) (1) 
 
                                                 
2 The database also includes what we call “tax reversals”, that is, reforms that reduce revenue collection. Note that the 
database from Akitoby et al. (2020) considers large tax revenue changes on the aggregate but also identifies tax 
reforms by sub-category (cf. footnote 6). Some of the reforms using tax specific instruments may be revenue 
decreasing. These are identified in Akitoby et al. (2020) Appendix table 4. Overall, in their database they identify 163 
reforms associated with positive revenue changes against 36 reforms associated with negative revenue changes, that 
is, the latter corresponds to 18% of the total of 199 major tax reforms. Given the low proportion of reform reversals 
in the total universe of observations, we decided to leave these out of the analysis. 
3 This is akin to the methodology proposed by Aoyagi and Ganelli (2015), who considered – looking at another issue, 
namely inclusive growth - the direct impact of a fixed block of structural determinants, coupled with a set of controls. 
4 For details on this binary choice model see, for example, Greene (2012, Ch. 17). 
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where α, 𝜷 are vectors of the parameters to be estimated, 𝑃𝑜𝑙 is a vector of political economy 
determinants, 𝑋 is a vector of exogenous control variables, and 𝛷(⋅)is the logistic function.5 𝜆𝑖 
denote country fixed effects to capture unobserved heterogeneity and different initial conditions 
or underlying structural characteristics. Our list of control variables includes: real GDP growth, 
inflation rate, trade openness and the unemployment rate. Such structural forces have also been 
put forward as influential forces to propel the reform momentum. For instance, small open 
economies may be more amenable to reform due to greater exposure to competitive pressures and 
international policy diffusion (see e.g. Belloc and Nicita, 2011). The structural model associated 
with (1) can be written as: 
 
 STR = 𝜆𝑖 + 𝜶𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝜷𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2) 
 
The STR variable can take the value one if there is a reform in any area of taxation including 
revenue administration.6  
𝑆𝑇𝑅it = 1  if  𝑆𝑇𝑅it
∗ > 0,  and 0 otherwise.  
with i = 1, …, N; t = 1, …, T; i captures the unobserved individual effects; and it is an error term.  
 
4. Data and Stylized Facts 
 
4.1 Structural Tax Reforms 
Countries influence the composition of their tax system by making changes to tax bases, 
tax rates and exemptions. The tax reform database used in this study has several advantages: it 
identifies the precise nature and exact timing of major tax actions in key areas of tax policy and 
revenue administration; identifies the precise tax reforms that underpin what otherwise looks like 
a gradual improvement in standard tax-to-GDP; identifies major reforms that truly led to increases 
in revenue, as opposed to just a long list of (small or not economically meaningful) policy changes. 
                                                 
5 We should note that, as probit models do not render themselves well to the fixed-effects treatment due to the 
incidental parameter problem (Wooldridge, 2002, Ch. 15, p. 484), we estimate a logit model with fixed-effects. 
6 Eight categories are considered and detailed in the next section, namely reforms in the area of: personal income tax, 




It should be noted that the tax reform database provides no information regarding the current (or 
past) fiscal stance in the countries under scrutiny, which is not the purpose of this paper.  
Tables 1-3 present stylized facts on reforms in the following categories: personal income 
tax (PIT), corporate income tax (CIT), goods and services taxes split between 3 subcategories 
(value added taxes (VAT), excises and other goods and services taxes), trade taxes, property taxes 
and, finally, revenue administration.7 The time evolution (interquartile range) of these taxes in 
percent of GDP for the sample of countries under scrutiny is displayed in Figure A1 in the 
Appendix and Table A1 presents summary statistics. Note that the vast majority of tax revenue 
reforms in our sample were in the category of goods and services taxes and most reforms were 
implemented during the period 2010-2015 (Table 1). Exceptions are, e.g., tax reforms in the area 
of excises, trade or property, which were implemented more during 2000-2004. In Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) the majority of tax revenue reforms were in the area of goods and services, and 
during the 2000-2004 period. In the more recent period, SSA has been focusing more on CIT 
reforms. 
 













Sample  all all all SSA SSA SSA 
PIT 9 6 9 1 3 0 
CIT 17 9 21 17 9 21 
Goods and Services Taxes 67 32 74 27 9 17 
GST 15 6 21 8 3 6 
VAT 21 10 17 10 3 4 
EXCISE 31 16 36 9 3 7 
TRADE 15 7 9 13 3 5 
PROPERTY 4 1 0 4 0 0 
REVENUE ADMINISTRATION 9 0 2 4 0 1 
 
Figure 1 provides the number of years of tax reforms identified in the sample and illustrates 
the heterogeneity of reforms efforts by type. Excise reforms have been more frequently 
                                                 
7 Revenue administration reforms includes measures in 8 distinct areas, namely: i) management, governance and 
Human Resources; ii) large taxpayers office and segmentation; iii) IT system; iv) registration and filling; v) audit and 
verification; vi) management of payment obligations; vii) improving compliance; viii) customs clearance. According 
to Akitoby et al. (2020), hiring more qualified staff, strategic planning and monitoring performance, focusing on 
training and strengthening tax legislation to empower revenue collection agencies were the most commonly 
implemented measures (77 percent of episodes). 
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implemented. In general, fewer major reforms have been implemented in the areas of property 
taxes. Reforms in tax administration have been more the rule than the exception, acompanying a 
specific tax policy measure. Out of 119 years of tax reforms, only 17 correspondend to tax policy 
measures not acompanied by improvements in revenue administration. 
 
Figure 1. Number of country-years with tax revenue reforms by type 
(45 developing economies, 2000-2015) 
 
In terms of geographical distribution, emerging market economies did more reforms in the 
area of personal income tax, value-added and excises, while low-income countries focused more 
on trade taxes (Table 2). As for other categories of taxes both groups are comparable and also 
when it comes to revenue administration reforms.  
 
Table 2. Reform shocks by group of countries (number of tax reform country-years) 
 EME LIC SSA Resource- 
Rich 
Fragile 
Number of countries 23 22 10 6 13 
PIT 16 8 4 2 4 
CIT 23 24 12 4 6 
Goods and Services Taxes 99 74 53 14 49 
GST 20 22 17 2 10 
VAT 30 18 17 0 17 
EXCISE 49 34 19 12 22 
TRADE 10 21 21 5 15 
PROPERTY 1 4 4 0 4 




















Type of Tax Revenue Reform
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Finally, tax reforms have been more frequently implemented during periods of higher 
economic growth—that is when the real GDP growth in each country was above its historical 
average (Table A3 in the Appendix).  
 
4.2 Political Economy 
To test the role of political variables in facilitating or impeding structural tax reforms, we 
propose an approach that relies on a principal component analysis (PCA), with variables grouped 
around three political dimensions: ideology, electoral proximity and political strength. Data on 
political economy variables are retrieved from Database of Political Institutions (DPI) (Cruz et al., 
2015). 
 
Ideology: This dimension captures whether a ruling government is left-wing or not. The DPI 
original value “chief executive party orientation (execrlc)” takes three discrete values: 1 for right-
wing parties, 2 for central and 3 for left. We define “left” as taking the value 1 if “execrlc” takes 
the value 3, and zero otherwise. 
 
Electoral proximity: This dimension would take into account the time that policy-makers have 
before forthcoming elections. Politicians facing elections might have higher or lower incentives to 
implement certain tax reforms depending on the tax area, vested interests and constituency voting 
support. We use three variables to compute the proximity to elections PCA. A higher electoral 
proximity is associated with a longer length of time in office for the party of the chief executive, a 
larger number of years of the chief executive in office and a higher number of elapsed years from 
the current term. Only the first principal component is retained since the first factor explains more 
than 48 percent of the variance in the standardized data (see Table 3). 
 
Political strength: This dimension would capture the number of political actors participating 
in fiscal decisions, which typically exhibit conflicting demands. These actors could be parties in 
government - or in opposition -, interest groups or, more generally, veto players. Strong 
governments are those which operate in less fragmented political environments. We use four 
variables to compute the strength PCA. More political strength is associated with a high margin of 
parliamentary majority, executive control of all houses, and a weak opposition given by a larger 
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number of parliamentary seats and voting share of the ruling government. Only the first principal 
component is retained as it explains more than 60 percent of the variance in the standardized data. 
 
Table A2 in the Appendix lists the corresponding PCAs´ factor loadings and uniqueness. We 
can interpret them as follows. For instance, with regard to political strength, the resulting factor 
appears to describe mostly the margin of majority and control of all houses, as indicated by their 
lower uniqueness. 
 
4.3 Other Data 
Real GDP growth, inflation rate, trade openness and the unemployment rate all come from 
the IMF´s World Economic Outlook (WEO) database. These control variables enter with a one-
year lag to minimize reverse causation issues.  
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
5.1 Baseline 
We begin with the estimation of our baseline logistic regression equation (1). We do so by 
adding not only the relevant control variables but also each block of political economy variables 
(ideology, election proximity and political strength) entering independently (specifications 1-3). 
We then replace the individual political economy variables with the computed PCAs 
(specifications 4-6). Results are reported in Table 3. The more developed a country is, the more 
likely it is to implement tax reforms. In contrast, countries characterized by high inflation tend to 
implement a fewer tax reforms possibly due to the availability of seigniorage and heightened 
economic volatility that makes the outcome of a given reform more uncertain. A poor labor market 
also seems to propel tax reforms while the effect of trade openness is statistically more ambiguous 
(but positive in specification 1 – in line with the findings by Belloc and Nicita, 2011). Turning to 
political variables, estimates with each of them entering in isolation does not give us a uniform 
picture nor strong results. The PCA alternative in contrast suggests that a left-wing government is 
less likely to implement tax reforms while both proximity to elections and political strength or 




Table 3: Determinants of structural tax reforms, baseline model 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Real GDP 0.051 4.047*** 3.842*** 4.040*** 3.833*** 3.288*** 
 (0.033) (0.525) (0.585) (0.520) (0.575) (0.728) 
Inflation rate -2.892*** -2.166** -4.614*** -2.142** -4.299** -8.991*** 
 (0.871) (1.059) (1.783) (1.050) (1.760) (2.738) 
Trade openness 0.008*** -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.005 0.004 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Unemployment rate 0.166* 0.768* 0.483 0.813* 0.484 0.634 
 (0.099) (0.455) (0.449) (0.455) (0.450) (0.491) 
Margin of majority   -0.000    
   (0.001)    
Control of all houses   0.001**    
   (0.001)    
Number government seats   -0.008    
   (0.006)    
Government voting share   0.011    
   (0.013)    
Party of the chief executive length of time in office  0.037*     
  (0.022)     
Chief executive years in office  -0.019     
  (0.034)     
Years elapsed from current term  0.001     
  (0.071)     
Left-wing -0.077     -0.885*** 
 (0.064)     (0.227) 
PCA electoral proximity    0.153  0.374* 
    (0.141)  (0.209) 
PCA political strength      0.270 2.550*** 
     (0.194) (0.802) 
       
Observations 923 679 624 679 624 458 
Pseudo-R2 0.042 0.221 0.219 0.219 0.213 0.278 
Note: All models are estimated by logit. Dependent variable is the structural tax reform binary variable. Standard 
errors are reported in parenthesis. Country fixed effects estimated but omitted. The constant term is not reported for 
parsimony. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
 
 
Table 3 used any tax policy or revenue administration reform as a dependent variable 
without making a differentiation among reform types. In Table 4, we remedy this and study the 
likelihood of reforms of different taxes/measures. For this purpose, we re-run specification (6) in 
Table 3 for alternative binary-type dependent variables. Out of the 7 tax reform categories, we 
examine the reform type that a left-leaning government would least likely implement. We find that 
revenue administration reforms fall in such category and so do reforms in PIT, CIT, VAT and 
excises. Electoral proximity seems to trigger personal income tax (PIT) reforms but has the 
opposite effect for trade tax reforms. More consistently, political cohesion is a necessary ingredient 
to move the tax reform agenda forward. This is true for most categories of tax policy instruments 





Table 4: Determinants of structural tax reforms, by tax category  
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable  
(tax reform) 
PIT  CIT GST VAT Excises Trade Property Revenue  
Administration. 
Real GDP -3.342* 2.548 5.298*** 2.460*** 4.689*** 2.662 745.892 3.538*** 
 (1.793) (2.029) (1.571) (0.902) (1.304) (4.811) (0.000) (0.783) 
Inflation rate -11.583** -5.961 -2.342 -4.429 -7.873** -86.614** 428.666 -7.788*** 
 (4.652) (4.456) (5.121) (4.371) (3.244) (42.071) (0.000) (2.805) 
Trade openness 0.001 0.007 0.004 -0.001 0.000 0.628** 11.505 0.005 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.316) (0.000) (0.006) 
Unemployment rate 2.675* 1.680 10.718*** 0.192 3.150*** 23.347* 1,023.122 0.619 
 (1.473) (1.111) (3.747) (0.838) (1.001) (14.330) (0.000) (0.509) 
Left-wing -1.924*** -1.669*** 0.034 -1.140*** -1.342*** 24.896* -59.314 -0.866*** 
 (0.624) (0.626) (0.976) (0.310) (0.309) (13.183) (0.000) (0.242) 
PCA electoral proximity 1.226** 0.207 -0.446 0.120 0.315 -4.083** -49.036 0.253 
 (0.528) (0.460) (0.483) (0.272) (0.291) (1.971) (0.000) (0.227) 
PCA political strength  5.800*** 2.006* 6.654* -0.945 3.166** 187.969* -255.184 2.419*** 
 (1.658) (1.086) (3.571) (1.396) (1.383) (105.813) (0.000) (0.812) 
         
Observations 126 122 127 254 286 101 61 399 
Pseudo-R2 0.278 0.273 0.355 0.188 0.335 0.773 1.000 0.269 
Note: All models are estimated by logit. Dependent variables identified in the second row. Standard errors are reported 
in parenthesis. Country fixed effects estimated but omitted. The constant term is not reported for parsimony. *, **, 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
 
Revenue administration reforms can involve multiple areas which are potentially sensitive 
to political influences. To delve deeper into the results, we re-did the previous exercise by zooming 
into the 8 specific areas of revenue administration for which we have information. Again, the more 
left-wing the government is, the more reluctant it is to reform the revenue administration (Table 
5). Being close to elections acts as a catalyst of revenue administration reforms particularly in the 
areas of HR, IT, registration and filling, audit, management of payment obligations and customs 
clearance. The lack of political fragmentation (that is, a higher PCA of political strength) increases 
the likelihood of reforms in this area. All in all, by looking at the standardized coefficients (not 
shown) one could argue that proximity to elections together with political cohesion can overcome 





Table 5: Determinants of revenue administration reforms 





















Real GDP -0.163 2.900* 1.145 0.581 1.310 -0.789 2.553* 0.979 
 (1.153) (1.540) (1.021) (1.133) (0.962) (1.893) (1.513) (1.395) 
Inflation rate -1.711 -4.038 -6.059 -10.368* -1.740 -1.022 -10.710 -8.516 
 (5.829) (6.068) (5.609) (5.953) (3.913) (6.963) (7.386) (7.185) 
Trade openness 0.012* 0.014* 0.005 0.013* 0.009 0.010 -0.007 0.011 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.023) (0.008) 
Unemployment 
rate 
0.577 -0.348 0.606 -0.611 -0.083 -0.608 3.000* -0.186 
 (0.957) (0.709) (0.925) (0.777) (0.606) (0.792) (1.602) (0.851) 
Left-wing -0.700** -0.902*** -0.598** -0.592** -0.562** -1.922** -0.519 -1.377*** 
 (0.283) (0.324) (0.281) (0.296) (0.260) (0.903) (0.331) (0.453) 
PCA electoral 
proximity 
0.888** -0.084 0.533* 0.903** 0.568** 1.691*** 0.040 1.146** 
 (0.346) (0.403) (0.296) (0.359) (0.280) (0.593) (0.401) (0.454) 
PCA political 
strength  
3.471** 2.316 2.341* 4.930*** 2.623** 3.245** 3.632** 4.692** 
 (1.439) (1.609) (1.214) (1.626) (1.141) (1.507) (1.751) (2.111) 
         
Observations 198 151 208 175 245 111 153 112 
Pseudo-R2 0.172 0.165 0.137 0.206 0.121 0.188 0.202 0.214 
Note: All models are estimated by logit. Dependent variables identified in the second row. Standard errors are reported 
in parenthesis. Country fixed effects estimated but omitted. The constant term is not reported for parsimony. *, **, 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
 
 
Next, we carry out an additional sensitivity check by splitting our sample along income and 
geographical lines and re-estimating the logistic regressions. Results, reported in Table 6, show 
evidence from using the baseline dependent variable, that is, STR, as well as the sub-component 
relative to revenue administration reforms only (the equivalent of specification 8 in Table 4). We 
can observe that the reform-hindering effect of the left ideology is stronger in low-income 
countries than in emerging market economies (the difference is statistically significant both in 
general tax reforms and revenue administration reforms). Excluding fragile states removes the 
significance of electoral proximity, while excluding resource-rich countries strengthens the 






Table 6: Determinants of inclusive growth: sub-sample analysis 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable  
(tax reform) 
General tax reform Rev. Adm. reform 
Sample  EME LIC Excl. Fragile States Excl. Resource Rich EME LIC 
Real GDP 2.038** 5.020*** 0.697 0.888 1.637* 8.667*** 
 (0.890) (1.364) (0.957) (0.960) (0.895) (2.454) 
Inflation rate -9.322** -14.955*** -5.232 -7.489* -9.438** -10.711** 
 (3.985) (4.766) (3.489) (4.273) (4.531) (5.140) 
Trade openness -0.017* 0.015* -0.007 0.010 -0.018* 0.017* 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) 
Unemployment rate 0.169 1.141 1.226 0.597 0.533 1.161 
 (0.783) (0.832) (0.778) (0.557) (0.860) (0.961) 
Left-wing -0.772** -1.355*** -0.825*** -1.099*** -0.540* -1.833*** 
 (0.313) (0.382) (0.246) (0.271) (0.329) (0.490) 
PCA electoral proximity -0.054 1.090*** 0.339 0.573** 0.062 -0.030 
 (0.278) (0.405) (0.252) (0.263) (0.296) (0.565) 
PCA political strength  1.141 5.598*** 3.134*** 5.232*** 0.665 8.318*** 
 (0.978) (1.927) (1.094) (1.406) (0.972) (2.813) 
       
Observations 294 163 281 280 235 163 
Pseudo-R2 0.231 0.430 0.187 0.210 0.204 0.486 
Note: All models are estimated by logit. Dependent variables identified in the second row. Standard errors are reported 
in parenthesis. Country fixed effects estimated but omitted. The constant term is not reported for parsimony. *, **, 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
 
 
5.2 Robustness  
 To test for the robustness of the results of the logistic regressions, we re-estimated the 
baseline model with a number of alternative estimators.  
First, we re-estimate the baseline specification resorting to an Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) approach. 
Second, we use a probit approach.  
Thirdly, and relatedly, we create a new count variable that adds the different reforms in 
sub-categories of taxation to have a scaling dimension for a given country and year. As a result, 
we estimate a multinomial probit model (MNP) to take account of alternative combinations of tax 
reforms. The MNP model is used with discrete dependent variables that take on more than two 
outcomes that do not have a natural ordering. In our context, there are up to 6 possible 
combinations of reforms that can be considered (from zero to plus five), such that the larger the 
number of reforms the better in our context. In the MNP model, the choice probabilities among a 
set of categorically distributed alternatives are simultaneously estimated.8 The stochastic error 
                                                 
8 MNP was the chosen method since the alternative, a multinomial logit model (MNL) assumes the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives (IIA). A violation of the IIA assumption results in inconsistent estimates. To test for a potential 
violation of the IIA assumption, we performed a Hausman-McFadden test and a Small-Hsiao test. Because the results 
of both the Hausman-McFadden and Small-Hsiao tests did not point at a confirmation of the IIA assumption, we could 
not safely use the MNL estimation and decided in favor of the MNP. 
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terms for the implementation of this model are assumed to have independent, standard normal 
distributions. Evaluating the likelihood function involves computing probabilities from the 
multivariate normal distribution.9 The dependent variable “STR=1” in equation (1) can be replaced 
by “STR=0,1,2,3,4,5” in the multinomial probit estimations in our panel dataset. 
Fourth, we employed an ordered logit model under the assumption that the larger the 
number of tax reforms the better in our context.  
Finally, we employ a rare events logit (or relogit) estimator. In a logistic regression, the 
Maximum Likelihood estimates are consistent but only asymptotically unbiased. The basic 
problem is having a number of units (structural tax reforms) in a panel that has no events. This 
means that the country-specific indicators corresponding to the all-zero countries perfectly predict 
the zeroes in the outcome variable (Gates, 2001; King, 2001).10 The simplest way of dealing with 
this problem is decreasing the rareness of the event of interest: by lowering the threshold of what 
constitutes the event of interest or expanding the data selection period, for example, there is less 
need to correct for rareness. Alternatively, the King and Zeng’s (2001) bias correction method, the 
relogit estimator, can be used.11 The relogit estimator for dichotomous dependent variables 
provides a lower mean square error in the presence of rare events and can be defined as follows: 
 
 Prob(𝑆𝑇𝑅it = 1|𝑍𝑖𝑡) = 𝛷(𝑍′𝑖𝑡𝜗) Prob(𝑆𝑇𝑅it = 1|𝑆𝑖𝑡, 𝑋it) = 𝛷(𝛼𝑖 + 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡′𝜼 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡′𝜸) (5) 
 






, 𝛼, 𝜂, 𝛾 are the vectors 
of the parameters to be estimated, and 𝛷(⋅)is the logistic function.  
 
The parameters can be estimated by maximum likelihood.12 However, as pointed out by King 
and Zeng (1999a, 1999b, 2001), the estimates of 𝛷(⋅) and 𝛷(⋅) ⋅ [1 − 𝛷(⋅)] among observations 
that include rare events (in our case, for which STR = 1) will be typically larger than those among 
observations that do not include rare events (i.e., for which STR = 0). Consequently, their 
                                                 
9 See Cameron and Trivedi (2005, chap. 15) for a discussion of multinomial models, including multinomial probit. 
Long and Freese (2014, chap. 8) discuss the multinomial logistic, multinomial probit and stereotype logistic models. 
10 This is a well-known phenomenon in the statistical literature (for an overview see Gao and Shen, 2007). 
11 King and Zeng (2001) describe rare events as “dozens to thousands of times fewer ones […] than zeroes”. 
12 And the variance of the estimated coefficients can be expressed as 𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?) = (𝑍′𝑉𝑍)−1, where V is a diagonal 
matrix, with diagonal entries equal to 𝛷(⋅) ⋅ [1 − 𝛷(⋅)]. In the case of rare events, 𝛷(⋅) will be generally small. 
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contribution to the variance will be smaller, rendering additional ‘rare’ events more informative 
than additional ‘frequent’ events. Therefore, we follow King and Zeng (1999a, 1999b) and correct 
for the small sample and rare events biases and estimate a relogit model where the sampling design 
is random or conditional on Zit.13 
The regression results of these alternative estimators are reported in Table 7.  
 
Table 7: Determinants of inclusive growth: robustness to alternative estimators 
 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Estimator  OLS Probit MNP Ordered Logit Relogit 
      
Real GDP 0.475*** 1.949*** 0.331*** 3.791*** 0.068* 
 (0.080) (0.411) (0.111) (0.706) (0.040) 
Inflation rate -0.192* -5.366*** -2.337 0.907 -6.802*** 
 (0.108) (1.591) (2.223) (0.859) (1.589) 
Trade openness -0.000 0.002 0.018*** -0.011* 0.011*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) 
Unemployment rate 0.059 0.369 1.035*** 0.749 0.054 
 (0.069) (0.292) (0.383) (0.597) (0.132) 
Left-wing -0.095*** -0.487*** -0.150 -0.490*** -0.438*** 
 (0.027) (0.125) (0.198) (0.187) (0.100) 
PCA electoral proximity 0.014 0.225* 0.405* 0.030 0.251** 
 (0.025) (0.120) (0.215) (0.188) (0.118) 
PCA political strength  0.086* 1.412*** -0.208 0.131 0.399* 
 (0.053) (0.451) (0.578) (0.453) (0.229) 
      
Observations 507 458 507 507 507 
R2 0.274     
Pseudo-R2  0.282  0.267  
Note: estimator identified in the second row. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Country fixed effects 
estimated but omitted. The constant term is omitted for parsimony. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 
5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
OLS estimates yield weaker results than those in Table 5, as one loses statistical significance 
of most macroeconomic controls and the two PCA variables. Probit estimates, in contrast, are very 
much in line with the logistic counterpart. The MNP keeps the positive and significant influence 
of electoral proximity on the likelihood of tax reforms, but the other two political economy proxies 
are not statistically different from zero. Finally, the relogit confirms the previous set of findings: 
negative and significant effect of left-wing governments and positive and significant effect of 




                                                 
13 We use the software package “relogit” provided by Tomz et al. (1999). 
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6. Conclusions  
 
In this paper, we studied the role of political variables in facilitating or impeding structural tax 
reforms in 45 emerging market and low-income economies during 2000-2015. The focus was on 
the contribution of ideology, the influence of elections and the impact of political fragmentation 
in political decision making—the three aspects that the literature has identified as key political 
variables.  
The results suggest that a left-wing government is less inclined to implement tax reforms while 
both proximity to elections and political strength or cohesion are positively associated with tax 
reforms. The reform-hindering effect of the left ideology is stronger in low-income than in 
emerging market economies.  Interestingly, revenue administration reforms are resisted the most 
by left-leaning governments. Proximity to elections seems to trigger reforms of personal income 
tax (PIT) but opposite holds for trade tax reforms. Not surprisingly, political cohesion is a 
necessary ingredient to reform most tax categories and revenue administration.  
Within tax administration, closeness to elections acts as a catalyst of reforms particularly in 
the areas of human resources, IT, registration and filling, audit, management of payment 
obligations and customs clearance. Greater political cohesion enhances the likelihood of reforms 
in these areas. All in all, proximity to elections together with political cohesion can overcome the 
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List of Countries by Region 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa (# 17): Burundi, Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Comoros, Republic of Congo, Gambia, 
Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Liberia, Malawi, Rwanda, Seychelles, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Namibia, Uganda, Burkina Faso 
 
Asia (# 8): Cambodia, Laos, Maldives, Nepal, Philippines, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu. 
 
Latin America (# 10): Ecuador, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Guyana, Belize, 
Jamaica 
 
Commonwealth of Independent States (# 5): Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Ukraine 
 
Middle East (# 4): Afghanistan, Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco 
 
Eastern Europe (# 1): Bulgaria  
 
 
Table A1. Summary Statistics – Tax Revenues (% GDP), 2015 
Variable  observations Mean  Standard deviation minimum maximum 
Tax revenue 45 18.12 6.38 6.50 32.24 
PIT 25 3.33 2.00 0.21 7.19 
CIT 26 2.67 1.33 0.0004 5.71 
Property 23 0.58 0.72 0.0004 2.52 
GST 31 6.25 2.60 1.35 11.04 
VAT 28 6.21 2.63 0.03 11.04 
Excises 28 2.41 1.37 0.18 5.35 
Tax 32 2.87 3.02 0.02 11.97 
 
 
Table A2: PCAs´ Factor Loadings and Uniqueness 
Variables Factors Uniqueness 
 proximity Strength  
longer length of time of party in office  0.79  0.37 
higher number of years available for the chief executive 
in office 0.81  
0.34 
years left in the current term 0.40  0.83 
margin of majority  0.87 0.23 
executive control of all houses  0.83 0.30 
government voting share  0.61 0.63 
government number of seats  0.77 0.40 













PIT 8 16 
CIT 20 27 
Goods and Services Taxes 75 98 
GST 17 25 
VAT 20 28 
EXCISE 38 45 
TRADE 10 21 
PROPERTY 2 3 
REVENUE ADMINISTRATION 48 54 




Figure A1. Composition of tax revenues (% GDP) in 45 developing countries, 2000-2015 
Total Tax Revenue Personal Income Tax 
  
Corporate Income Tax Value-added Tax 
  
Trade Tax Property Tax 
  
Excise Tax  
 
 
Note: green line denotes the 75th percentile of the respective distribution; the blue line denotes the mean; the red line 
denotes the median; and the yellow line denotes the 25th percentile of the respective distribution. All charts expressed 
in percentage of GDP. 
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